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Achieving Transparency: An Argument For Enactivism 
 
Abstract: The transparency of perceptual experience has been invoked in 
support of many views about perception. I argue that it supports a form of 
enactivism – the view that capacities for perceptual experience and for 
intentional agency are essentially interdependent. I clarify the perceptual 
phenomenon at issue, and argue that enactivists should expect to find a 
parallel instance of transparency in our agentive experience, and that the 
two forms of transparency are constitutively interdependent (Section 1). I 
then argue that i) we do indeed find such parallels: the way in which an 
action is directed towards its goal through our bodily movements parallels 
the way in which an experience is directed towards its object through our 
perceptual sensation (Section 2), and ii) reflecting on sensorimotor skills 
shows why the two instances of transparency are constitutively 
interdependent (Section 3). Section 4 gives reasons for generalizing beyond 
the cases considered so far by applying the enactive view to Kohler’s 
landmark studies of perceptual adaptation. The final section clarifies the 
form of enactivism to which the previous sections point. The view that 
emerges is one whereby our perceptual and practical skills are interrelated 
aspects of a single capacity to have one’s mind intentionally directed upon 
the world. The transparency of experience, on this view, is achieved in virtue 
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of our capacities as agents as much as it is given in virtue of our capacities as 
perceivers. 
 
 
1. Transparency and Enactivism 
 
G. E. Moore famously noted that our conscious visual experience of the world is 
diaphanous, or transparent, in the following sense: 
  
“The moment we try to fix our attention on consciousness and to see what, 
distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere 
emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the 
blue: the other element is as it were diaphanous.” (Moore (1903), p.25) 
 
That is, it seems that when I focus my attention on the experienced blueness of the sea or 
sky, I attend to properties of the sea or sky, not to properties of my experiential state. 
However, Moore continues the above passage: 
 
“Yet it [the sensation, or ‘other element’] can be distinguished, if we look 
attentively enough, and if we know that there is something to look for.” (Ibid.) 
 
That is, we can also take up a stance with respect to our visual experience such that the 
experience is, at least partly, opaque – we can attend to properties of our experience that 
do not seem to be properties of the experienced environment. Most recent discussion of 
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these considerations aims at establishing their bearing upon the debate between 
representationalists and non-representationalists about perceptual experience. 
Representationalists (e.g. Harman (1990), Dretske (1995), Tye (1991, 1995, 2000)) argue 
that the transparency of experience supports the thesis that experience consists only in 
the representation of facts about the perceiver’s environment and her relation to it. Non-
representationalists (e.g. Block (1996), Shoemaker (2002), Loar (2003)) argue that 
experience can be opaque with respect to objects and properties of the perceiver’s 
environment, and that this supports the thesis that experience involves awareness of 
sensory properties that outrun its representational properties. I won’t be directly 
concerned with this debate in what follows.1 Instead, I want to consider the significance 
of Moore’s observations about experience for enactivism. Enactivism about perceptual 
experience (defended in various forms by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991), Hurley 
(1998), Noë (2004, 2008, 2009), Thompson (2007), and Hutto & Myin (2013)) involves 
the claim that perceptual experience essentially depends upon capacities for intentional 
agency. Here, I am interested in a version of enactivism according to which there is 
essential interdependence between perceptual experience and agency – one that also holds 
that capacities for agency essentially depend on capacities for perceptual experience.2 
This paper aims to motivate and explicate such a view through exploring the 
phenomenon of transparency that Moore’s remarks identify. 
 
What should an enactivist predict, and what must they explain, in light of Moore’s 
observations? They must, like anyone interested in the transparency of experience, 
explain how it is possible to take up each of two apparently conflicting attitudes to one’s 
experience – viewing it as transparent or as opaque – and how these attitudes are related. 
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The enactivist should also predict that analogues of Moore’s observations, and the 
explanations they receive, will apply to agency. For if perception and agency are 
essentially interdependent, then our account of the essential structure or nature of one 
capacity must invoke facts about the other. The simplest instance of such interdependence 
would be symmetrical, such that for every property of perception that is explained partly 
through appeal to agency, we find a parallel property of agency that receives parallel 
explanation through appeal to perception.3 How would this look in the case of 
transparency? Well, suppose we take Moore’s observations to suggest something like 
this: There is an essential duality to perceptual experience – we can attend either to the 
worldly situations that experience reveals, or to the sensory appearances through which 
they are revealed to us, but apparently not to both at once (I do more to motivate this 
construal in the next section).4 In that case, we should expect to find some parallel duality 
in the case of agential experience. Moreover, our account of the relationship between the 
dual aspects of perception should be paralleled in the case of agency. And, since the 
enactivism on which we will focus is a thesis about the essential and symmetrical 
interdependence between perception and agency, we should expect a constitutive 
explanation of the duality in each capacity to invoke facts about the other capacity, and 
expect the constitutive explanations of each duality to exhibit parallel structures. 
 
These, I take it, are substantial requirements. If we found that such parallels obtained, 
first between a structural duality in perception and in agency, and second between 
plausible explanations of those dualities, each of which made essential reference to the 
other capacity, then the truth of enactivism could be invoked as a simple and compelling 
explanation of why such parallels exist. I will show that we find such parallels when we 
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consider the phenomenon of transparency, and draw out the consequences of these 
parallels for enactivism. The next section makes a prima facie case that there are relevant 
parallels to be explored by briefly clarifying the perceptual phenomenon under 
consideration, and describing a parallel phenomenon for agency. Section three sketches 
an account of the interdependence of these phenomena by considering the interplay 
between perception and agency in the possession and exercise of perceptual and practical 
skills. Section four further clarifies and motivates this account by applying it to Ivo 
Kohler’s (1964) landmark studies on perceptual adaptation. There we will see that the 
account can accommodate important nuances in Kohler’s results that trouble its 
competitors. Section five concludes by describing the enactivism I think we should infer 
from the structural and explanatory parallels identified in the previous sections and 
clarifying its philosophical significance. 
 
2. Transparency in Perception and Action 
 
Look at the labelled squares in the checkerboard illusion.5 One looks white (and in shade), 
the other looks grey (and well lit). Now attend to them independently of their role in the 
picture, as two coloured patches. You should be able to see that they are, in fact, 
identically coloured. With a little effort, you can shift between seeing them as differently 
coloured squares on a depicted chessboard and as identically coloured patches on your 
monitor. However, doing so does not seem to involve shifts in the character of your 
experience. Rather, what alters seems to be your attitude towards, or mode of attention 
to, the constant character of your experience. Moreover, it seems impossible to take up 
both attitudes at once – we can see the squares as identically or differently coloured, but 
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not as both simultaneously. Attending to the squares in one way precludes attending to 
them in the other. Two more examples: when I look at the circular lip of a cup from an 
angle, I see it as circular. Yet there is also a sense in which it appears elliptical – I can see 
that it looks like an ellipse would if viewed from above, or that I would draw its apparent 
shape from here by drawing an ellipse. I cannot, it seems, attend to the circular 
appearance and the elliptical aspect of the cup’s lip simultaneously. Similarly, I can attend 
either to the shapes, colours and sizes of the dots that make up a pointillist painting, or to 
the scene depicted by those dots, but not to both at once. 
In what follows, I argue that these examples illustrate three general points about 
perceptual experience: In perceptual experience, our attention is usually directed upon the 
worldly objects and situations with which experience puts us in touch; however, we can 
also attend to the ways in which we are put in touch with objects and situations – that is, 
we can attend to the sensory appearances through which the world is revealed to us; yet 
it seems impossible to attend to our experience in both these ways at once – each mode of 
attention precludes the other. 
 
Here is an example of the parallel phenomenon for intentional agency. When typing 
fluently, your experience is of typing words and phrases, not of typing letters, or of the 
details of the movements of your fingers as they strike the keys. But try shifting your 
attention to the details of the positions and movements of your fingers while typing, or 
the letters you are typing. You will not be able to do so without disrupting the fluency of 
your typing, even though it seems you are merely shifting your attention to an aspect of 
your activity that was there all along. Two more examples: when I unreflectively reach 
out to turn a door-handle in front of me, I do so through moving my body in specific 
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ways appropriate to that task. Usually, insofar as I experience what I’m doing in such a 
case at all, I simply experience myself as grasping a handle, or opening a door. However, 
I can also attend to the details of the bodily movements I am making. Again, doing so 
seems to involve shifting attention to an aspect of my activity that was there all along. It 
seems, though, that I cannot simultaneously experience my activity as a detailed sequence 
of movements and as a world-directed action at the same time. Similarly, when a ballet 
dancer performs through making a complex and coordinated sequence of bodily 
movements, he cannot simultaneously attend to the details of those movements on pain of 
disrupting his performance, despite the fact that his performance is achieved through 
those movements, and that those movements are there to be attended to throughout. 
 
The duality we find in perception between that which we experience and the sensory 
appearances through which it is experienced has a parallel in agency; the duality between 
the action we experience ourselves as executing and the bodily movements we use to 
execute it. So here are the three parallel points that, I will argue, the above examples 
illustrate: when we act, our attention is usually directed upon the objects and outcomes 
we intend to effect; however, we can also attend to the movements we are using to 
execute our intentions; yet it seems impossible to attend to our activity in both these 
ways at once. Consequently the success of our activity is often compromised if we attempt 
to attend to the movements through which that activity is pursued. This appears to 
parallel the way in which attention to sensory appearances can stop them playing their 
usual role of disclosing objective properties, as when attention to the dots in a pointillist 
painting prevents us from simultaneously experiencing the depicted scene. 
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Two caveats about the scope of the above points. First, perhaps not all perceptual and 
agential experiences exhibit the above dualities. If I experience a homogeneous field of 
uniform colour, perhaps there is no distinction between what is involved in attending to 
the object of my experience and attending to the sensory appearances through which I 
experience it. Likewise, if engaged in a simple action such as flexing a leg muscle, perhaps 
there is no distinction between what is involved in attending to my action and in 
attending to the movements with which I make it. As we’ll see in section 5, the enactivist 
view outlined here will have something to say about both types of case. For now, the 
above remarks are supposed to show only that there is a prima facie case that many of our 
perceptual and agential experiences seem to exhibit the above dualities. If this is granted, 
then it’s plausible that investigating such dualities might reveal something interesting 
and important about perception and agency. 
Second, whilst the above characterisations of experience are hopefully 
uncontroversial, the question of what (if anything) they reveal is not. Some answers to 
that question will be incompatible with the enactivism I think is supported by the above 
parallels and their explanations. For example, one might react to the duality identified for 
perception by holding that one level of experience is privileged or primitive – that strictly 
speaking we experience only sensory appearances, and experience objective features and 
properties only in some derivative or misleading sense (or vice versa for objective 
features and sensory appearances). On such views, characterising perceptual experience as 
involving a duality is misleading, so the project of uncovering parallel dualities in 
perception and agency that each receive complementary explanations is a non-starter. 
Alternatively, perhaps the above examples point not to an interesting conclusion about 
enactivism, but to a boring one about attention – that we are no good at attending to two 
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things at once. Neither possibility has been undermined at this point. Thus far, I have 
only made a prima facie case for the existence of one kind of parallel which enactivism 
predicts between perception and action. To show that this parallel is real and significant 
in the way the enactivist requires, I need first to show that it can be plausibly accounted 
for in the way they suggest. 
 
3. Enactivism and Sensorimotor Skills  
 
Enactivists hold that perceptual experience and agency are essentially and symmetrically 
interdependent, and so must give a constitutive explanation of the duality in each 
capacity that makes essential reference to the other capacity.6 Here, in outline, is the 
explanation which the next two sections will motivate: A perceiver’s capacity to 
experience sensory appearances as transparent to the worldly situations they disclose 
essentially depends on those appearances directly and non-inferentially poising her to act 
in ways distinctively appropriate to those situations. An agent’s ability to experience the 
fine details of her bodily movements as transparent to the higher-level actions she 
executes through them essentially depends on her perceptual sensitivity to the presence 
of the opportunities those actions aim to exploit. Transparency in perception and in 
action thus essentially depends upon the subject’s possession of abilities; to act in the case 
of perception, and to perceive in the case of action. The relevant abilities are 
constitutively and symmetrically interdependent – that is, we cannot make sense of the 
subject’s possessing such perceptual abilities without invoking facts about what she is 
able to do, or of her possessing such practical abilities without invoking facts about what 
she can perceive. 
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What does all that mean, and why believe it? Considering what is involved in the 
possession and exercise of perceptually guided skills helps with both questions. 
 
Bruce Lee’s character (‘Lee’) in Enter the Dragon claims that, in combat, ‘When I see an 
opportunity, I do not hit; it hits all by itself.’ Let us take him at his word. The quote 
suggests that he perceptually experiences not just opponents and their movements, but 
also opportunities; that his experiences of such opportunities are bound up with the 
execution of the actions they afford; and that he does not consciously infer or decide upon 
the movements and timing of his action, but experiences his action as spontaneously 
drawn from him by the situation.7 What capacities must we credit to Lee to make it 
intelligible that he experiences things in this way? First, an immediate, non-inferential 
perceptual sensitivity to the relevant kind of opportunity – otherwise his experience will 
be of deducing that the opportunity is there from what he sees, not of being immediately 
moved to action by his experience of it. Second, the ability to quickly and fluently act in a 
way tailored to the requirements of the situation – otherwise his experience will be of 
seeing the opportunity and striving, or being unable, to do something about it. 
Those perceptual and practical capacities are constitutively interdependent – 
intelligibly crediting him with one requires him to possess the other. Lee couldn’t 
experience the situation in the way suggested by his quote if he could perceive the 
opportunity, but lacked the capacity to act upon it. For then, it seems, he would 
experience the situation as belonging to some theoretical type, not as immediately 
compelling him to act. His perceptual sensitivity to the afforded opportunity must engage 
with a practical grasp, rather than a detached theoretical understanding, of what can be 
done if it is to issue in the experience the quote describes. Conversely, his possession of 
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the relevant practical ability depends on his capacity to deploy it in light of his perception 
that it is currently appropriate. If he accidentally struck his opponent via the ‘right’ 
movements (by flailing around, having a muscle spasm, or trying to do something else) 
this would not constitute a deployment of his skill. His skill consists not just in the ability 
to make some sequence of movements, but in making movements appropriately attuned 
to the perceived contingencies of his situation, that would remain so attuned throughout 
a variety of subtly different situations. So what Lee can skilfully do is dependent on how 
he can perceive the situation, and how he can perceive the situation is dependent on what 
he can skilfully do. This is an instance of the structural interdependence of perception and 
agency to which enactivism is committed.  
How does this bear on transparency? Due to his range of bodily skills, Lee’s 
perceptual experience can be transparent in a way that yours or mine is not – it can 
directly present him with opportunities for, and impediments to, various combative 
techniques, rather than merely with positions and situations from which such 
opportunities and impediments may be inferred. His experience of his skilled activity can 
involve a parallel transparency – he can directly experience himself as performing certain 
techniques in response to the situation’s perceptible demands, rather than as performing 
deliberations preceding, or movements making up, those techniques. These instances of 
transparency are constitutively interdependent. That is, Lee’s possession of the capacity 
to directly perceive his situation in terms of its demands is intelligible only if he also 
possesses the capacity to act in response to those demands. And his possession of the 
capacity to experience his action in terms of the opportunity it exploits is intelligible only 
if he possesses the capacity to perceive the situation in terms of such opportunities. So 
there are parallel dualities in Lee’s exercise of both his perceptual and his agentive 
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capacities, with each duality essentially depending on facts about the corresponding 
capacity. 
 
Here is another case. Our experience of our activity when typing fluently involves 
transparency – though our typing involves moving our fingers and striking keys, we 
experience ourselves as directly executing intentions to type whole words (perhaps whole 
phrases). When typing fluently, our experience of finger movements and keystrokes is 
transparent in that the experience of our activity is directed through them to the typings 
of words that they realise. Fluent typing involves a parallel instance of perceptual 
transparency, pertaining to our proprioceptive sense of the position and movements of 
our fingers over the keys. Just as Lee directly experiences environments in terms of the 
opportunities for attack or defence they afford, so we (when typing fluently) experience 
the position and movements of our fingers in terms of their actual and potential 
contributions to the typing of words. Our perceptual experience of the fine details of the 
position and movements of our fingers is transparent in that it is directed through them 
toward the actually and potentially salient affordances for typing words that those 
positions and movements allow. 
Remember your days as a novice typist. Neither your agential nor your perceptual 
experience were transparent in the above ways. Though your goal may have been to type 
the same words, you had to achieve this by consciously and intentionally seeking out and 
pressing their constituent keys. And your proprioceptive sense of the position of your 
fingers on the keyboard told you nothing about how to move in order to type the desired 
words – instead you had to look and see how the actual and potential positions of your 
fingers were related to your goal of typing a word or phrase.8 Progression from novice to 
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fluent typist altered the ways your perceptual and agential experiences could be 
transparent. This amounted to altering both what you could do with (or through) the 
keyboard, and how you could perceive it. When typing fluently you can now use the 
keyboard in the direct and non-inferential execution of an intention to type a word. And 
you can now perceive the position and movements of your fingers over the keys in terms 
of their actual and potential contributions to your current projects of typing words.  
Again, these new practical and perceptual abilities are essentially interdependent. 
We can experience our activity as the typing of a word, rather than the pressings of some 
keys, only if we experience those keystrokes and the movements required to make them 
as automatically drawn from us in light of our perception of the situation. Otherwise we 
would experience those keystrokes and movements as individually decided upon and 
executed by us on the basis of the perceived position of our hands. But this is how the 
novice, not the expert, experiences their typing. So the fluent typist’s way of experiencing 
their activity essentially depends on a capacity to perceive their fingers upon the keys in a 
particular way. In turn, this perceptual capacity essentially depends on the practical 
ability to quickly and fluently type words and phrases. Without that ability, the typist 
might have a perfectly acute sense of the position of her hands upon the keys, but could 
not put this sense to use in fluent typing. Rather than automatically grasping what to do 
on the basis of that sense, she would have to make inferences about how her goal of 
typing was best achieved in light of the sense’s deliverances. And this is how the novice, 
not the expert, perceives the position of their fingers upon the keys. 
 
This explains why attending to the letters one is typing, or to the movements one is 
making, disrupts fluent typing. Fluent typing involves having one’s perceptions and 
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intentions directed at words – sensing the position of one’s fingers in terms of their actual 
and potential contribution to typed words, and perceiving the movements of one’s fingers 
in terms of the words they bring about. This point about the direction of the typist’s 
perceptions and intentions is just a different expression of our characterisation, above, of 
the particular way in which the skilled typist’s intentions and perceptions are transparent 
to their objects: she experiences herself intending and effecting words and phrases 
through the transparent movements that bring them about; she experiences the position 
of her fingers in terms of affordances for typing intended words through the transparent 
details of their position which determine those affordances. One’s perceptions and 
intentions being directed and transparent in these ways is partly constitutive of fluent 
typing.9 Attending to keys, finger movements, or individual letters, thus involves 
directing one’s perceptions or intentions in a way that is necessarily incompatible with 
fluent typing. And since exercises of the perceptual and practical capacities involved are 
constitutively interdependent, directing attention in a way that frustrates the exercise of 
one will necessarily cause the other to break down. The enactivist thus gives a unified 
explanation of why the skilled typist cannot simultaneously attend to each aspect of the 
duality of either her perceptual or her agential experience when typing. And the 
explanation generalises to other cases. We should suppose that, like our typing, Lee’s 
skilful performance would break down were he to attend either to his bodily movements, 
or to the objective features of his perceptible environment through which opportunities to 
act were revealed to him.10 On the above account, this is because it is necessarily 
impossible for him to attend to his action simultaneously as a strike appropriate to his 
current situation and as a detailed sequence of bodily movements, and necessarily 
impossible to attend to his situation simultaneously in terms of its objective perceptible 
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properties and in terms of the opportunities it affords. Each impossibility receives a 
parallel explanation: the transparency of his bodily movements to his skilful actions, and 
the transparency of the objective properties of his perceptual situation to the 
opportunities currently afforded, are each constitutive features of the activity in which he 
is engaged. And since the instances of perceptual and agential transparency essential to 
his activity are constitutively interdependent, directing his attention in a way that 
frustrates one instance of transparency necessarily causes the other to break down. 
 
We have now seen various instances of parallel phenomena of transparency for 
perception and agency, and how the parallel phenomena considered in this section can be 
given an explanation in terms of the symmetrical constitutive interdependence that 
characterises enactivism. However, the two activities we have just used to illustrate and 
work through the form of such explanation are both instances of sensorimotor skills 
demanding a tight interplay between the subject’s perception and action. Perhaps it is 
unsurprising that we should find strong bonds between experience and agency here, even 
if the nature of those bonds is just as the enactivist suggests. So our next task is to 
examine a source of evidence that might allow the enactivist to generalise beyond the 
cases of sensorimotor skills considered above. 
 
4. Enactivism and Perceptual Adaptation 
 
One important source of support for the claim that visual perception essentially involves 
sensorimotor skill11 has come from reflection on what Kohler’s (1964) studies of 
perceptual adaptation show about the relationship between perception and action.12 
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Kohler’s subjects went about their daily business while wearing goggles that invert the 
visual field, thus disrupting their capacities for veridical perception of, and fluent 
engagement with, their environment.13 Adaptation involves both perceptual and practical 
components – subjects must come to understand the new way in which their visual 
experience informs them of their relation to their environment, and must adjust their 
intentions and activity to fit with the way their environment is really arranged, rather 
than with the way their distorted sensory experience presents it as being. After a period 
of disruption to their perceptual and intentional activity, subjects adapt to the goggles, 
regaining their ability to navigate and act upon their environment without inference or 
deliberation about how to move in order to achieve their goals. Moreover, subjects report 
that the way things look and feel to them reverts to normal over the course of adaptation 
– the distortive interface imposed by the goggles has become transparent for them. When 
the goggles are removed, subjects undergo a period of complementary distortions, 
disorientation and adaptation. 
These results are supposed to support enactivism by showing that the acquisition 
of familiarity with the new goggle-induced sensorimotor contingencies – that is, the new 
ways that sensory experience varies with movement and discloses possibilities for action 
– coincides with the adaptation of perceptual and agential experience. Moreover, the fact 
that removing the goggles causes a new period of perceptual distortion and adaptation 
suggests that familiarity with such sensorimotor contingencies is a determinant of the 
content and character of our everyday perceptual experience – the normalisation of the 
experience of adaptees depends upon their regaining a familiarity that standard perceivers 
already possess.14 
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Kohler’s studies are a useful test case for us since they appear to involve disruption and 
adaptation of both perceptual and agential experience. However, existing accounts of 
Kohler’s results treat one instance of adaptation as primary, and attempt to explain the 
other in its terms. One camp (whose members include Taylor (1980), Hurley (1998) and 
Noë (2004)) holds that subjects’ perceptual experience adapts whilst the content of their 
intentions remains fixed. The fluency and experienced immediacy of action returns, they 
claim, only because perceptual experience reverts to being just as it was pre-goggles, and 
so regains its fit with unchanged practical capacities. A second camp (whose members 
include Harris (1980), Linden et al (1999) and Prinz (2006)) holds that experience 
remains distorted, but that the spatial content of subjects’ intentions adapts. On that 
view, adaptation consists just in the return of a subject’s capacity to act in and upon their 
environment in a way that is directly and non-inferentially informed by their perceptual 
experience. Contra the first camp, that capacity is not restored in virtue of perceptual 
adaptation, but through the contents of subjects’ intentions adapting so as to fit with the 
distorted way their perceptual experience now presents the world. 
Each position is problematic. As Klein (2007) notes, the fact that Kohler’s subjects 
regain abilities to engage in fluent perceptually-guided intentional behaviour, such as 
skiing, bicycling and fencing, whilst reporting that their visual experience remains 
inverted tells against the first explanatory strategy. However, the fact that adapted 
subjects sincerely report that things visually look to them as they did before, not just that 
they have learned to cope with the new way that things appear, tells against the second. 
 
The enactivist has independent reasons to reject both problematic positions. If perceptual 
and agential capacities are symmetrically and constitutively interdependent then we 
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should not expect either to adapt while the other remains fixed. More specifically, the 
enactivist holds that the capacity to experience sensory appearances as transparent to the 
worldly situations they disclose essentially depends on those appearances directly and 
non-inferentially poising a subject to act in ways distinctively appropriate to those 
situations (as when Lee’s ability to see an opportunity to strike depends on his being 
poised to strike by his perceptual sensitivity to relevant features of his situation). 
Conversely, the capacity to experience the details of one’s activity as transparent to the 
goal at which it aims essentially depends on the capacity to perceive one’s situation in 
terms of its affordances of such goals (as when Lee experiences himself as striking, rather 
than as moving his body, in virtue of his capacity to perceive his situation in terms of 
opportunities to strike). So, if enactivism is true, then neither of the above views on 
adaptation is viable. The first view holds that the direction of subjects’ intentions remains 
unchanged throughout their reacquisition of the capacity to directly perceive the spatial 
affordances of their environment, but the enactivist holds that the direction of intentions 
depends on the regained capacity. The second view holds that subjects’ perceptual 
experience remains unchanged throughout the reacquisition of the capacity to act in 
direct and non-inferential response to perception of their surroundings, but the enactivist 
holds that the content and character of perceptual experience depends on the regained 
capacity. 
Given this, the enactivist should expect Kohler’s experiments to show the 
following: perceptual and agential adaptation consist in regaining the transparency 
involved in perceiving and acting before the goggles were donned. That is, perceptual 
capacities adapt such that subjects can see through the abnormal appearances caused by 
the goggles to the distal spatial properties of their environment; practical capacities adapt 
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such that subjects can experience their activity as a direct response to the perceived 
situation, rather than a sequence of movements whose fit with the situation is inferred on 
the basis of perception. Since the regained capacities are constitutively interdependent, 
perceptual and agential adaptation will occur together. And, given what we have learned 
about transparency thus far, it should be possible even after adaptation for subjects to 
direct their attention to the unusual ways things appear through the goggles, or the 
unusual relationship between how things are perceived and the movements they make to 
act upon things – neither perceptual nor agential adaptation will be unequivocal. 
 
In fact, due attention to the reports of Kohler’s subjects reveals compelling evidence for 
such a view. As noted above, the hypothesis that perceptual experience adapts to fall back 
into line with subjects’ unchanged intentions is troubled by cases where the return of 
fluent intentional behaviour appears to precede experiential adaptation, as when Kohler 
reports of an adapting subject: 
 
“On the fourth day the subject went on a bicycle trip.  On the last [6th] day he 
went on a skiing excursion. During all this time, however, his perceptions were 
only sporadically right side up…” (Kohler (1964) p. 31) 
 
However, the apparent support for the view that intentional or behavioural adaptation 
precedes (or obviates the need for) perceptual adaptation is undercut by Kohler’s 
subsequent clarification of the sporadic circumstances where orientation was veridically 
perceived: “…things appeared right side up only when they were simultaneously touched 
[…] or when they happened to be in the subject’s immediate vicinity” (Ibid), suggesting 
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that the return of normal vision first occurs when perceiving something that is being 
acted upon, or which could be acted upon (as when it appears in the subject’s peri-
personal space). We find corroborative observations throughout the accounts of 
adaptation. For example, Kohler reports of the subject described above: “During a 
simulated fencing match the subject parried all blows correctly, even though the opponent 
was seen upside down” (Ibid, my emphasis). However, Kohler’s subsequent discussion of 
the fencing tasks (p.154) suggests that, when immersed in the task, the trajectory and 
orientation of the approaching rapier point was perceived correctly – that is, the part of 
the world with which the subject was engaged in successful fast and fluent visually-
guided interaction was perceived veridically while the rest was not.15 One further 
example of the interdependence of fluent intentional activity and the return of veridical 
perception: describing his own experience of walking down a hill after thirteen days 
wearing the goggles and before visual adaptation had occurred, Kohler writes: 
 
“At first the impressions are very contradictory. I feel myself closest to the 
ground where it appears furthest away. But this impression does not last for 
long. More and more frequently it alternates with a particularly satisfying 
feeling that ‘everything fits,’ especially, it seems, the more dangerous and steep 
the incline. At such moments of course I have no time to be critical about my 
images; the tactile impression transmitted by hand and foot wins out every time, 
and suddenly everything ‘fits together.’ But when I have reached the foot of the 
incline, a region of much less danger, then I notice that the optical picture is 
‘really’ reversed, and I wonder why I had not noticed this during the descent 
itself.” (p. 156, original emphasis) 
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 Here (as in the fencing case), the subject is in a situation that demands responses of a 
speed and fluency incompatible with consciously inferring the movements he should 
make on the basis of his distorted experience. He is forced to allow his perceptual 
sensitivity to his environment to draw the appropriate movements from him, and when 
he does so the content of his spatial experience seems to normalise.16 Fluent perceptually-
guided action and veridical perception return together. 
 
Kohler’s quote brings out the second important feature of his results for the enactivist: 
the distinct and apparently contradictory attitudes subjects can take up toward their 
visual experience. Above, Kohler implies a contrast between how things are experienced 
during his steep descent and how his experience seems upon subsequent reflection. 
Similarly, Kohler reports of the fencer described above that “the subject saw the rapier 
point approach in reversed direction as before when instructed to have a ‘critical set 
towards visual experience’” (p.154), and reports the following exchange between an 
adapting subject (‘Grill’) and his colleague (Professor Erissman): 
  
“Grill says: ‘It seems that everything in vision is the way it really is; the house, 
for instance, which I see through the right window, really appears to be on the 
right; and the parts of the car look just as they would feel if I were to touch 
them…’ Prof.  Erismann comments: ‘Did you experience this visually?’ But this 
critical question is too much. The subject withdraws: ‘Please… I can’t say I saw 
this correctly, for vision in this case was uncontrolled vision … I sat in the car and 
didn’t think about anything in particular, and suddenly I thought that people 
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walked by on the correct side, and not through me… funny things are 
happening, particularly when I don’t think about them…’” (p. 154-5, original 
emphasis and ellipsis) 
 
Such observations all suggest a contrast between the distal properties and situations 
which adapting or adapted subjects can veridically experience (when engaged in, or 
seeing possibilities for engaging in, visually-guided interaction with them) and the 
abnormal sensory appearances through which they are experienced.17 The fact that, in 
many circumstances, adapted subjects say that things spatially appear just as they did 
before the goggles were donned suggests that the abnormal appearances can become 
transparent for the subjects, and we saw evidence above that their becoming transparent 
coincides with the return of the subject’s capacity to engage in fluent visually-guided 
interaction with the environment. But, in keeping with our account of transparency, the 
aberrant appearances are still there to be attended to. What is such a shift in attention 
like, phenomenologically, for Kohler’s subjects? Of the shift between experience of distal 
spatial properties and of distorted sensory appearances which occurs during adaptation, 
‘Grill’ notes that “this isn’t a sudden reversal; the picture remains the same but it is 
experienced differently” (p.155, my emphasis). So here is another clear parallel with our 
other cases of transparency. Just as we can shift from seeing the scene depicted by a 
pointillist painting to seeing the dots through which the scene is depicted without sudden 
change in the character of our experience, Grill can shift from veridically seeing distal 
objects and properties to experiencing the distorted appearances supplied by the goggles. 
And just as inappropriate direction of attention can frustrate the instances of 
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transparency we considered above, so Grill’s attention to sensory appearances prevents 
him from seeing through them to the distal properties they reveal.18 
 
Do we find a parallel duality in adapted subjects’ experiences of their fluent activity, as 
the enactivist should predict? Here is one suggestive observation. Kohler and Erissman 
are attempting to test Grill’s assertion, eighteen days into adaptation, that he veridically 
experiences the layout of the street when he stands next to the wall.  
 
“We … gave Grill the instruction to stand near the wall.  This being done, he 
walked to the curb and stumbled off the sidewalk.  To our astonished query he 
replied, ‘I saw the wall there (points left) and thought, well now you go right, 
since that’s the way to be sure to get there.  This proves to me that I saw the 
wall correctly in the first place and that I don’t have to make any more 
corrections!’” (Ibid, p.155) 
 
If Grill is typical of Kohler’s subjects, some of whom can cycle, ski, and fence after 
eighteen days, then his visuomotor behaviour should be largely normal by this stage – he 
should be able to negotiate his visible environment fluently, without needing to infer or 
deliberate over the movements he should make (his being able to do so would explain 
Kohler and Erissman’s astonishment at his falling off the curb). That is (according to the 
enactivist), he should be able to experience his activity as a direct response to his 
perceived situation, rather than as a sequence of movements calculated to fit his situation. 
But this is not what happens in the episode described above. Grill and the experimenters 
are explicitly concerned with the fit between Grill’s visual experience and the spatial 
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properties of his environment. Perhaps because of this, Grill tries to navigate to the wall 
not by being unreflectively guided by his experience, but by thinking about the 
movements he should make on the basis of how things are presented to him in 
experience. The enactivist suggestion is that Kohler’s subjects can take up two 
perspectives with respect to their activity – experiencing it as a direct response to the 
perceived environment, or as a sequence of movements whose fit with the perceived 
environment is inferred – and that Grill’s shifting to the second perspective is responsible 
for the disruption of his fluent visuomotor behaviour, in just the same way that shifting 
one’s attention to one’s finger movements disrupts fluent typing. 
However, we should not set too much stock in a single example. The other 
aspects of the enactivist interpretation of Kohler’s results are supported by multiple parts 
of Kohler’s data. Unfortunately, because Kohler was interested in visual adaptation, there 
is little in his reports to inform an account of the agentive experience of his subjects. 
Whether or not the agentive experience of adapted subjects exhibits the duality predicted 
by the enactivist is an open empirical question which future studies might address.19 
 
Let’s take stock. We have been investigating the possibility that consideration of the 
phenomenon of transparency reveals a symmetrical interdependence between perception 
and agency of the kind to which enactivism is committed. The previous section 
characterised that interdependence with the help of two examples of visuomotor 
behaviour, and showed how such interdependence can underpin instances of perceptual 
and agential transparency. In this section we have been investigating whether Kohler’s 
work on perceptual adaptation gives us reason to apply this view of the interdependence 
between perception and agency beyond clear cases of visuomotor skill. We saw that 
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enactivism makes the following predictions about Kohler’s cases, which differ 
substantially from existing explanations and accounts of his results: 
 
1. Perceptual and agential adaptation will both occur, and do so simultaneously. 
2. Perceptual adaptation will be equivocal – adaptees will still be able to attend to 
the distorted sensations through which they perceive their environment. 
3. Attending to sensations in this way will disrupt the restored veridicality of 
subjects’ perceptions. 
4. Agential adaptation will be equivocal – adaptees will still be able to attend to the 
inverted movements that must be used to effect their perceptible environment. 
5. Attending to movements in this way will disrupt the restored fluency of subjects’ 
actions. 
 
Close attention to the reports of Kohler’s subjects reveals compelling evidence for the 
first three points, and Kohler also reports at least one case that appears to support the 
last two. So the enactivist view of the interdependence between perception and action 
affords an account of Kohler’s results that avoids the problems faced by existing 
interpretations, and can predict and explain nuances in Kohler’s data that are ignored by 
existing interpretations and that appear quite mysterious from their perspectives. If 
Kohler’s results show something general about the relationship between perception and 
action, then what they show is the truth of enactivism. Adaptation to Kohler’s goggles 
consists in regaining two interrelated kinds of transparency: of perceptual sensations to 
worldly situations, and of bodily movements to the opportunities and outcomes they aim 
to exploit. The reports of Kohler’s subjects give us good reason to think that these two 
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forms of transparency are essentially interdependent in just the way the enactivist 
suggests. 
 
5. Enactivism, Transparency and Intentionality 
 
The observations about transparency with which we began have been invoked in support 
of many claims about perceptual experience. I have argued that they can also be invoked 
in support of a form of enactivism – the previous sections aimed to show that we find 
parallel and essentially interdependent phenomena in both perception and agency with 
just the nature and structure we would expect if enactivism were true. Enactivism is 
offered here as the best explanation of these parallels. But there is a deeper motivation for 
arguing for enactivism in this rather baroque way. The interrelations between the 
transparency we find in perception and in agency are, for the enactivist, symptomatic of 
the interdependence between the ways in which one’s perception and one’s agency are 
directed upon the world. Understanding this latter interdependence helps us better 
understand the explanatory ambitions of enactivism. 
 
I noted above that precedent for an enactivism that stresses the interdependence of 
perceptual and agential capacities is found in Hurley (1998). There Hurley notes that 
corresponding to the Myth of the Given – the idea that contentful perceptual experience 
can consist in passively received input from the world to the mind – is the less infamous 
Myth of the Giving – ‘the idea that the contents of intentions directly reflect the 
spontaneously active mind, are a matter of pure output’ (p.76). Suppose we agree that the 
Myth of the Given is to be avoided; that our capacity to be informed about the world 
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through perception is one that requires explanation. One plausible strategy for avoiding 
this myth is to appeal to our capacities as agents. Perception can inform us because we 
can spontaneously and actively impose conceptual forms on perceptual sensations (Kant 
1998, Sellars 1956, McDowell 1996), or because it puts us in a position to discriminate, 
classify, or otherwise act upon the world (Pettit 2003, Matthen 2005), or because we 
understand our capacities to skilfully manipulate our ongoing sensory relationship to the 
world (Noë 2004, 2012). Insofar as such strategies neglect to explain how active exercises 
of conceptual, classificatory or sensorimotor capacities have the particular contents that 
they do, they court Hurley’s Myth of the Giving; if we agree that our perceptual capacity 
to be given material for thought and experience by the world stands in need of 
explanation then it is unclear why this should not also be true of our practical capacity to 
give determinate content to our activities and practices.20 So if, like many, we are tempted 
to avoid the Myth of the Given by appealing to facts about our agency, we should do this 
in a way that acknowledges that our capacities as agents are themselves in need of 
explanation.  
 
The account of perception and agency as constitutively interdependent capacities implied 
by the above treatment of transparency suggests how we might avoid both myths 
together. The previous sections concerned cases where the ways perception could be 
directed upon the world depended on the ways in which activity could be directed, and 
vice-versa. The perceptual and practical capacities of Kohler’s subjects returned together 
– veridical perceptual experience of spatial layout is imposed upon what would have been 
a chaotic jumble of sensation when the subject acquires the ability to non-inferentially 
tailor their actions to the layout of their environment on the basis of that sensation. But 
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the ability to act in non-inferential response to the spatial affordances of the situation 
(rather than to make movements based on an inferred fit with the situation) is in turn 
dependent on perceptual sensitivity to those affordances – what would have been a mere 
sequence of movements becomes an action aimed at grasping some opportunity when the 
subject acquires the capacity to allow their movements to be unreflectively guided by her 
perceptual sensitivity to the presence of that opportunity. We might thus sum up the 
enactivist view as follows: In perception, the world draws actions from us; in agency, we 
draw experiences from the world; the capacities to relate to the world in each of these 
ways are constitutively interdependent. If we accept this view, then the projects of 
understanding perception and agency are interrelated aspects of an overarching project – 
understanding what is involved in our minds being directed upon the world. Upon this 
construal, the phenomenon of transparency with which we have been concerned is of 
fundamental importance for understanding our mindedness.  
 
Returning to some points left unresolved at the end of section 2 lets us see why. There 
we briefly mentioned possible reasons to doubt that the phenomenon of transparency 
yields general morals about perception and action. Perhaps the phenomenon results from 
a quirk in our capacities to attend – for example, a simple inability to simultaneously 
attend to objects and to visual sensations. Perhaps there are cases of perceiving and 
acting – viewing a homogeneous expanse of colour, flexing a leg muscle – that do not 
exhibit transparency. We are now in a position to understand how the enactivist should 
respond.21 We saw in section 3 that the enactivist gives a unified explanation of the 
impossibility of simultaneously attending to each aspect of the duality in one’s perceptual 
and agential experience. To attend to an opportunity to strike, rather than to shapes and 
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positions, was to bring a specific set of skills to bear on one’s situation – the skills of a 
martial artist rather than those of, say, a painter or photographer. Likewise, in Kohler’s 
studies we saw that adapted subjects could attend to either their distorted visual 
sensations or the properties of the environment that those sensations disclose to them. 
Attending to the latter was bound up with the capacity to skilfully act on one’s 
perceptible environment; attending to the former was bound up with adopting a detached 
or critical attitude to one’s visual experience. It is impossible for Lee or Kohler’s subjects 
to simultaneously attend to both aspects of these experiences insofar as it is impossible 
for them exercise both of the corollary sets of skills simultaneously.  A parallel point 
applies for agency – Lee cannot simultaneously attend to his strike as a response to the 
situation and as a detailed sequence of movements; we cannot simultaneously attend to 
our activity as fluent typing and as detailed finger movements. As we noted in section 3, 
this is because fluent striking or typing constitutively depends on the capacity to perceive 
one’s situation in terms of its striking or typing affordances, rather than affordances for 
mere bodily movements. Attending to each aspect of agential experience is impossible 
insofar as it is impossible to exercise each perceptual capacity simultaneously. So, 
according to the enactive account offered here, the impossibility of simultaneously 
attending to each aspect of the duality in perceptual or agential experience is explained by 
a fact about what it is to have one’s attention directed toward one (intentional) object 
rather than another. Where our attention is directed is a matter of the skills we bring to 
bear on our situation, and some sets of skills cannot be exercised simultaneously.22 
  
The enactivist thus agrees that the phenomenon of transparency reveals something about 
our capacity to attend to objects, but denies that what it reveals is trivial. Transparency, 
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claims the enactivist, reveals the phenomenological structure required for being able to 
attend – to direct one’s mind in perception and agency – at all. This ambitious claim is, I 
think, what is most philosophically important and interesting about enactivism. 
Motivating it further will involve dealing with the other unresolved points from section 
2: aren’t there cases of perceiving and acting that fail to exhibit transparency? Consider 
perception first. Are there cases where we perceive something, but not by or through 
perceiving something else?23 Seeing a uniform expanse of colour seems a natural 
candidate. The enactivist holds that for experience to be directed upon an object the 
perceiver must grasp the bearing of her experience on her agential relationship to that 
object; or, what amounts to the same thing, she must understand how she can actively 
modulate her perceptual experience of that object.24 Enactivists thus hold that surface 
colours are perceived through grasping one’s active relation to patterns of light and shade, 
shadows and gleams (Broackes 2007, 2011). But what about a field of colour that offered 
no such pattern, just pure homogeneity? Note first that even if you are in a ganzfeld, 
where every part of your perceptible environment yields identical perceptual sensation, 
you can still grasp the related facts that any exploratory movement you make will yield 
identical sensation, and that all accessible parts of the visual scene are equally silent as to 
the actions they afford.25 Enactivists can hold that as long as grasp of this minimal 
relationship between perception and agency is maintained, experience will continue to be 
directed toward an object, even if that object is merely a homogeneous expanse of colour. 
But note also that this situation would, from the perceiver’s perspective, be 
indistinguishable from one where the relationships between activity and sensation had 
been severed rather than merely homogenized. The enactivist, it seems, should predict 
that a perceiver’s visual experience in such circumstances should be ambiguous between 
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experience of a homogeneous field and no experience at all. Interestingly, this bizarre 
prediction seems to be borne out by the reports of some ganzfeld inhabitants. Cohen 
(1957, p.407) quotes the following description as representative: “…everything blacks 
out, returns, goes. I feel blind. I’m not even seeing blackness. This differs from the black 
when the lights go out.” Similarly, Billock and Tsou (2001, 2004) note that, when images 
are artificially stabilized on the retina (another way of creating a perceptual situation 
ambiguous between absent and homogenised sensorimotor contingencies), 
  
‘Typically the perception … would last a few seconds before the entire field 
would switch abruptly to blackness or nothingness. Then the [coloured] field 
would regenerate, either spontaneously or in response to a blink.’26 (2001, 
p.2398-2399)  
 
Moreover, they say, ‘Descriptions of this “black field” as “blacker than black” do not do it 
justice. Our subjects describe it as “like someone cut my optic nerves and I don’t have a 
visual system anymore”’ (2004, p.85). These reports suggest that despite their intact 
sensory sensitivity to perceptible features of their environment, subjects alternate 
between veridical experience of those features and a complete cessation of visual 
experience. The enactivist explains this result by noting that these are situations where it 
is indeterminate whether sensorimotor contingencies linking perception and action still 
obtain. The upshot, then, is that perception of a homogenous field of colour is not a 
counterexample to the enactivist claim that perceptual experience involves a transparency 
that is dependent on a grasp of how the perceiver can actively modulate the way the 
situation appears. Perceiving a uniform field of colour involves grasping the uniformity of 
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the different appearances that you can bring into view. The enactivist suggests that the 
cessation of visual experience that can occur in a ganzfeld, or due to the stabilization of 
images on the retina, occurs when such a grasp is lost.27 
 
What is this supposed to show? The ambitious claim mooted above was that 
transparency, understood in terms of the interplay between practical skills and sensory 
capacities described in the previous sections, is a phenomenological structure required for 
having one’s mind directed toward the world. If this is true, then a lack of transparency – 
or, what amounts to the same thing for the enactivist, a lack of interdependence between 
activity and experience – should entail a lack of experience. The ganzfeld and retinal 
stabilization cases, and the enactivist understanding of them, are presented as a first step 
towards defending the plausibility of this claim. Another necessary step will be to address 
a parallel issue for agency. If the ambitious enactivist claim is right, then severing the ties 
that link activity and experience should result in the extinction of agentive experience as 
well as perceptual experience. So addressing the final question we left dangling becomes 
pressing – are there cases of intentionally directed activity that fail to exhibit the kind of 
transparency we have been investigating? The enactivist holds that intentional agency 
requires the agent to grasp the relationship between movements and the perceptible 
outcomes at which they aim. Our agential experience thus involves a duality – we can 
attend either to movements or outcomes. But to experience those movements as directed 
toward outcomes – that is, to experience them as actions – we must grasp their relation to 
perceptual experience. So for the enactivist, the question of whether we can have an 
agential experience that fails to exhibit the duality characteristic of transparency reduces 
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to the question of whether we can experience ourselves as acting intentionally without a 
grasp of the perceptible consequences at which our actions aim. 
Suppose I try, successfully, to waggle my finger. Plausibly, this is a basic 
intention, one which I can execute without trying to do anything else. But even in trying 
to waggle my finger (rather than to flex it, or keep it perfectly still), my action aims at a 
particular set of sensory consequences – feeling and perhaps seeing my finger doing 
particular things. And I experience myself as executing my intention insofar as I 
experience those consequences being brought about. Are there cases where these normal 
relations between activity and sensory consequences are severed – the kind of cases we 
need to test the enactivist claim? 
There is a rich experimental literature devoted to manipulating experiences and 
judgments of agency by manipulating sensory feedback.28 For example, building on 
classic studies by Nielsen (1963) and Fourneret & Jeannerod (1998), Farrer et al (2003a) 
manipulated subjects’ judgements of agency by manipulating the extent to which the 
movements of a virtual hand presented on a screen deviated from the subjects’ real hand 
movements, which were hidden from view. They found that the likelihood of subjects 
attributing the perceived movements to another agent increased with the level of 
distortion they introduced between the subjects’ hand movements and those displayed on 
screen. However, this result falls short of what the enactivist needs. Even in cases where 
subjects judged that the displayed movements were not their own, they nonetheless 
experienced themselves as acting – as moving their hand around in a way that failed to 
correspond to what they saw. This, the enactivist should claim, is because they still 
(correctly) take themselves to be modulating their sensory experience in law-governed 
ways – whilst the experimental design disrupts the way in which visual feedback varies 
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with motor output, kinaesthetic feedback depends on motor output just as before, and 
accounts for the experience of agency that subjects still have. The right test case for 
enactivism would be one that severed ties between movement and kinaesthetic sensation 
too. Interestingly, when Farrer et al (2003b) performed a similar experiment with a 
deafferented subject (lacking kinaesthetic sensation) they found that when the 
relationship between the subject’s movements and visual feedback was highly distorted, 
‘she reported impressions of not controlling her movements, and not being aware of what 
she was doing’ (p.616). The enactivist interpretation of this result is that the subject no 
longer experiences her bodily activity as an exercise of agency – despite her intention to 
perform the drawing task, and making movements suited to completing this task – since 
the experimental setup has undermined her grasp of the way her movements relate to 
sensory consequences.29 Another relevant case is that of Oliver Sacks (1986), who 
temporarily developed a form of somatoparaphrenia with respect to part of his left leg – 
as a result of a bad injury he could neither feel nor move it, and came to feel ‘alienated’ 
from it: 
 
‘It seemed to bear no relation whatever to me.  It was absolutely not-me – and yet, 
impossibly, it was attached to me – and even more impossibly, “continuous” with 
me’ (p.48). 
 
This looks like a case where Sacks may have (with good reason) lost his grasp on a part of 
his body as a potential source of sensory feedback. In spite of this, should he not still be 
able to try to flex his thigh, and have the agentive experience associated with such trying? 
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The enactivist claims not, and this appears to be borne out when Sacks recounts his 
attempts of trying to move his leg: 
 
‘I couldn’t try, I couldn’t will, I couldn’t think, I couldn’t recall.  I couldn’t think 
or recall how to make certain movements, and my ‘efforts’ to do so were 
delusory, derisory…’ (p.43) 
 
Moreover, during his recovery Sacks describes his experiences of trying as returning 
concurrently with his perception of involuntary muscle twitches: 
 
“Here was a movement … which involved active contraction of the whole quad – 
a movement hitherto impossible and unthinkable.  And yet, in a trice, I had 
thought it, and done it. … I had the impulse, flash-like – and flash-like I acted.  
The idea, the impulse, the action, were all one – I could not say which came first, 
they all came together. … The impulse, the idea, the remembrance, flashed back 
– and I moved my leg (if ‘moved’ is not too deliberate a word for the utterly 
undeliberated, spontaneous movement which ‘occurred’).” (p.95-6) 
 
If we understand Sacks’ condition as involving the loss and recovery of a grasp of his leg 
as a potential conduit of sensory consequences, then the enactivist can predict and explain 
his unusual agential experience. The suggestion is that a ‘basic’ action like flexing a leg 
muscle is not a counterexample to the enactivist claim that agency involves a 
transparency that depends on a grasp of the relationship between the agent’s movements 
and the perceptible consequences they aim to bring about. If the flexing of a muscle is to 
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be experienced as something that I do, rather than something that happens to my 
muscles, it must involve an understanding of the sensory consequences that the flexing 
brings about. The enactivist suggests that it is the return of this understanding that 
explains Sacks’ experience of muscle twitches in his leg as exercises of agency. 
 
Let’s take stock. I began by drawing some parallels between transparency in agency and 
experience, and aimed to show that those instances of transparency were constitutively 
interdependent. In the previous section, we saw that this understanding of the role of 
transparency in perception and agency can predict and explain features of Kohler’s work 
on perceptual adaptation that have been mishandled or ignored by existing treatments. 
The enactive account of transparency was offered as the best explanation of the range of 
cases considered in sections 2 – 4. In this section my aim has been to clarify the 
understanding of perception and action to which the previous sections point. The real 
lesson of transparency, I suggest, is an enactive one. Pure sensory input, divorced from 
skilful activity, does not suffice for experience. To see something is always to understand 
how it is revealed to you through something else, and this understanding is available to us 
in virtue of our capacities as agents. Likewise, pure motor output, divorced from 
perceptual sensitivity, does not suffice for agency. To intentionally do something is 
always to understand one’s bringing it about through something else, and this 
understanding is available to us in virtue of our capacities as perceivers. There is no pure 
‘Given’ in perception or ‘Giving’ in action – perception and action work together as two 
aspects of a single capacity to have one’s mind intentionally directed upon the world. The 
phenomenon of transparency with which we began this paper is thus something that is 
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achieved, in virtue of our capacities as agents, as much as it is given, by our capacities as 
perceivers.30 
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1 See Crane (2006), Kind (2003) and Martin (2002) for illuminating surveys of and 
comments upon that debate. Alston (1999, 2005), Martin (2002) and Kennedy (2009) 
argue for naïve realism on the basis of transparency. Ultimately I think that the view I 
defend in what follows supports a naïve realist view of the relation of experience to 
objects. See Speaks (2009) for an alternative proposal about the relevance of 
transparency to our thinking about perception. 
2 Such a view is explored in Hurley (1998). Though the other forms of enactivism listed 
above focus on the dependency of perception on agency, they are all compatible with the 
further claim that agential capacities reciprocally depend on perceptual capacities. 
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Because I think (for reasons that will emerge in what follows) that viewing perception 
and agency as essentially interdependent is the most plausible form of enactivism, I will 
use ‘enactivism’ to refer to a view that endorses this interdependence claim. 
3 Of course, the interdependence between perception and agency might instead be 
asymmetrical. So failure to find parallel phenomena and explanations between 
perception and agency need not undermine enactivism. The interdependence may also 
be symmetrical with respect to some phenomena, but not to others. An aim of this paper 
is to make plausible that, at least with respect to the phenomenon of transparency, the 
dependence is symmetrical. 
4 As I use ‘transparent’ in what follows, experience is transparent when we are aware 
only of the objects of experience, not of the ways in which those objects are subjectively 
presented to us. But an experience’s being transparent in this sense does not preclude 
our becoming aware of properties of the experience other than how it presents its objects. 
This is a departure from the way some parties to the representationalist/non-
representationalist debate understand transparency (e.g. Block (1996), Tye (2000)), who 
mean transparency to entail the impossibility of becoming aware of properties of one’s 
experience that are independent of the properties of the experienced objects. 
5 The checkerboard illusion depicts a cylinder, lit from behind, standing on a chessboard 
and casting a shadow on some of the squares. A white square depicted as in shadow is 
rendered in the same shade of grey as a black square depicted as in good light. Despite 
being rendered in identical colours, one square is perceived as black and the other as 
white. 
6 Bear in mind (as per n.2, above) that I’m not hereby attributing this claim to any of the 
authors standardly construed as enactivists. Again, though, for reasons that will follow I 
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think this is the most plausible form of enactivism, and one that is consistent with the 
work of the main enactivist authors cited above. 
7 The above are all frequently cited aspects of the phenomenology of skilled athletes and 
performers immersed in peak activity across many cultures and domains. In David 
Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest a former tennis player describes a similar experience: ‘The 
court becomes … an extremely unique place to be. It will do everything for you. It will 
let nothing escape your body. … You slip into the clear current of back and forth, 
making delicate X’s and L’s across the harsh rough bright green surface, your sweat the 
same temperature as your skin, playing with such ease and total mindless effortless 
effort… You’re barely aware you’re doing it. Your body’s doing it for you and the court 
and Game’s doing it for your body. You’re barely involved’ (p.166). Another nice 
example is from the autobiography of ice hockey goalie Ken Dryden: ‘When a game gets 
close to me, or threatens to get close, my conscious mind goes blank. I feel nothing, I 
hear nothing, my eyes watch the puck, my body moves … I don’t tell it to move or how 
to move or where, I don’t know it’s moving, I don't feel it move – yet it moves. … I see 
something in the way a shooter holds his stick, in the way his body angles and turns, in 
the way he’s being checked, in what he’s done before that tells me what he’ll do – and 
my body moves. I let it move. I trust it and the unconscious mind that moves it’ (p.214-
215). See Csikszentmihalyi (1990) for extensive description and discussion of such 
experiences. 
8 Note that even here your perception and agency manifested transparency in the sense 
under discussion. You didn’t see which key to press by first seeing the shape marked on 
it – as a skilled reader, your perceptual experience was directed toward the appropriate 
letter due to your perceptual sensitivity to the shape which realised it (cf. the experience 
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of someone learning to read, or using a keyboard with characters in an unfamiliar 
language or font). Nor did you press the right key by intending to do something with 
your body – as a skilled user of your body, your perception of the right key coupled with 
your intention to strike it took care of the details of your movement for you (cf. the 
experience of someone learning to use a prosthetic device, or regaining the use of a limb 
after a long period of injury). 
9 Someone might learn to type equally fast by focussing intently upon individual keys 
and movements, but this is not what we do when we type fluently. 
10 The phenomenon of the ‘yips’ in sports is a familiar illustration of the detrimental 
effects upon performance of ‘overthinking’ one’s movements or the situation to which 
one is responding. See e.g. Bawden and Maynard (2001) for an interesting review. 
11 Other important lines of support include Hurley’s (1998) exploration of various 
arguments for the claim that the unity of perceptual consciousness constitutively 
depends on agency, Hurley and Noë’s (2003) compilation of empirical support for the 
claim that sameness and difference in the character of sensory experiences tracks 
sameness and difference in sensorimotor contingencies, and Noë’s (2004, 2005, 2008) 
offer of enactivism as the best explanation of how perception acquires volumetric 
content. 
12 Similar procedures and results to Kohler’s are reported in Stratton (1897), Taylor 
(1963, 1980), Yoshimura (1996) and Linden et al (1999). I focus on Kohler (1964) since 
he provides the most detailed descriptions of subjects’ experiences of adaptation.  See 
below, and note 17, for my reasons for being unimpressed with Linden et al’s claims to 
have shown that perceptual adaptation does not occur. 
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13 Kohler also conducted experiments with left/right reversing goggles, distorting 
prisms, and various coloured goggles. The following discussion is restricted to 
up/down inverting goggles, though the morals I draw can be applied to all the cases of 
spatial distortion and adaptation.  
14 The claim that Kohler’s results show something general about the role of 
sensorimotor contingencies in perceptual experience (rather than something about their 
role in experiments like Kohler’s) is made more plausible by viewing Kohler’s results 
alongside the other empirical evidence enactivists adduce in support of the role of 
sensorimotor contingencies in normal perception. See Hurley (1998), Hurley and Noë 
(2003) and Noë (2004) for reviews. Although Noë’s use of Kohler’s results to support his 
enactivism has been widely criticised (by Block (2005), Prinz (2006), Aizawa (2007) and 
Klein (2007)) those critics do not challenge the supposition that the results support 
general conclusions about the relationship between perception and agency. As will 
become clear below, close attention to Kohler’s results shows how enactivists should 
respond to these criticisms. 
15 Space constraints prevent me from detailing and discussing several other relevant 
examples. But consider also Kohler’s observation that a subject’s hands – their most 
frequent points of intentional engagement with the environment – were the first objects 
to be perceived as veridically oriented (p.32), and his description of an identical 
dependency of experiential re-inversion on engagement with objects (either manually or 
by touching them with a stick) for a different subject (Ibid.). See also the experiment 
described on pp. 157-8, and the observations on pp. 161-3.  
16 Kohler goes on to note that: “Observations of this kind became more and more 
frequent, and were tested in all kinds of situations: for example, when subjects walking 
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over a narrow board were pushed off sidewise by the experimenter, everything was 
suddenly in order at the moment of the push; at other times, however, the subject would 
be in doubt whether the right foot was visually ‘right’.” (Ibid.) 
17 See also Kohler’s remarks on the different results obtained by measuring adaptation 
in laboratory and free vision settings on p. 45-6, p. 153-4 and p. 162 (Ibid). Those 
remarks, and the examples above, show why we should reject Linden at al’s (1999) claim 
to have demonstrated that visual experiential adaptation does not occur. In addition to 
using trials of a length that Kohler’s results suggest are insufficient for full adaptation, 
they base their claim on asking subjects about what they experience, and monitoring 
subjects’ performance on an extraction of gradient from shading task. But as Kohler 
acknowledges (and the enactivist account explains), asking subjects to reflect and report 
on their experience can disrupt the experience of adaptation, and laboratory tests of 
specific aspects or determinants of visual experience fail to capture the extent of 
adaptation in free vision. 
18 Note that asking subjects to report upon their visual experience, in contrast to 
reporting on how they experience the world around them, is apt to influence subjects to 
direct their attention in just this way. Professor Erismann, reflecting on his own 
experience of adaptation to prismatic goggles suggests after ten days that the 
perceptual distortions “have become less pronounced. I am hardly aware of them now. I 
think this is because they are not part of the environment on which my attention is 
focussed. Even when I do notice them, it is in a highly subjective manner.” (p.62) 
19 Here is another example that I think supports this aspect of the enactivist view: with 
a little practice it is possible to become relatively proficient at writing and drawing 
whilst looking only at a reflection of one’s hand in a mirror. The process of adapting to 
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the new relationship between the visually perceived position of one’s hand and the 
movements required to execute intentions to write or draw parallels the adaptation 
required of Kohler’s subjects. The relevant parallel prediction is that the adaptation of 
one’s visuomotor behaviour involves coming to experience one’s writing or drawing 
activity in terms of the intentions it aims to execute, not the movements through which 
this is achieved, and that attempting to attend to such movements should disrupt the 
fluency of one’s action. When I try this, it seems to me that this prediction is borne out. 
To succeed in fluently writing what I intend, I must let my activity be unreflectively 
guided by what I see in the mirror – that is (on the enactivist interpretation) I have to 
experience my activity as a direct and non-inferential response to the affordances for 
writing that I have learned to see in the mirror image. If I attempt to attend to the 
specific movements I make while writing then the fluency of my performance 
disappears. Of course, I am neither an unbiased nor a theoretically uncontaminated 
subject. 
20 One way in which Hurley (1998, ch.6) brings out the need for an explanation of how 
our activities and practices get their content is through considering Wittgenstein-
inspired skeptical arguments about rule-following. Being confronted with the puzzle of 
what (if anything) determines that my activity is properly described as, say, addition 
rather than quaddition helps us see why the problem of how we can ‘give’ content to our 
worldly activities is as pressing as the problem of how the world can ‘give’ us material 
for thought and knowledge in perception. 
21 Note that compelling assent to these enactivist responses is beyond the scope of my 
task here – doing so would, I think, require a deeper exploration of arguments that 
purport to show that perception, agency and attention must have the structure under 
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discussion. I think we find good arguments to this effect in the work of Hegel and 
Merleau-Ponty, among others, though discussion of them must wait for another 
occasion. 
22 Integrating these brief remarks on attention up with relevant empirical and 
philosophical literature is another important and interesting task that I can’t attempt 
here. The view briefly outlined above comports well, though, with the view of attention 
as selection for action defended in Wu (2011, 2014) and Bullot (2011). 
23 More needs to be said about the status of the appearance properties on the enactivist 
account. My locutions here, and throughout, might be taken to imply a particular 
conception of the relation between sensory appearances and the properties they reveal; 
one whereby appearance properties are non-representational ‘qualia’ or the ‘mental 
paint’ via which objective properties are depicted. This conception, however, will not sit 
well with enactivists who endorse a naïve realist or relationalist view of perception (e.g. 
Noë 2008, 2009; Ward 2012) due to the indirect view of perceptual experience it implies. 
An alternative, following Noë (2004), is to construe appearance properties as objective 
properties of a perceiver’s relationship to her environment – perhaps including lighting 
conditions and the perceiver’s state of perceptual adaptation – and so construe a shift in 
attention from the perceived object to appearance properties as a shift in attention from 
i) the object to which one is perceptually related, to ii) aspects of the perceptual relation 
itself. The account developed in this paper is intended to favour the latter construal for 
at least two reasons. Firstly, we have seen various cases where the properties or features 
through which the object of perception is revealed to us do not fit the description of 
qualia or mental paint – e.g. when Bruce Lee sees an opportunity to strike through his 
sensory awareness of spatial properties, or when we see the words on the page through 
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our sensory awareness of the letters which compose them. Secondly, the examples we 
are about to consider are intended to put pressure on the idea that there are ‘pure’ 
sensory appearances that are essentially independent of their agency-mediated role of 
disclosing objects to us. This latter construal, of course, faces the problem of explaining 
the qualitative or felt dimension of episodes of sensory awareness. Tackling this 
problem is beyond the scope of my task here – though see Ward, Clark and Roberts 
(2011) for one enactivist proposal. 
24 It is worth noting that not all enactivists follow O’Regan and Noë (2001) and Noë 
(2004) in holding that sensorimotor contingencies must be ‘grasped’ or ‘understood’ to 
issue in perceptual experience. Block (2005) and Hutto (2005) raise objections to 
enactivist views that appeal to sensorimotor understanding. According to the view I 
wish to endorse, the relationship between a subject’s perceptual and practical skills 
involved in perception is one which already implicates the relevant kind of 
understanding – the links between Bruce Lee’s perceptual and practical capacities 
constitute the kind of sensorimotor understanding required to perceive opportunities to 
strike. A full articulation and defence of this conception of sensorimotor understanding 
is a task for another paper. However, precedent for the view of the interdependence of 
understanding, perception and agency that is at issue here can be found in McDowell’s 
work on practical wisdom (e.g. McDowell 1979). 
25 Noë (2004, p.135) makes the first of these points. 
26 Ellipses added here to suppress the complication that Billock and Tsou (2001) were 
working not with a homogeneous field of colour, but with a dichromatic one. The goal 
of stabilizing these images on the retina was to induce experiences of ‘forbidden’ colours 
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– reddish greens and bluish yellows – which they succeeded in doing in most subjects 
prior to visual blackouts. 
27 As Billock and Tsou (2004) note, the fading of retinal images is usually attributed to 
‘transient temporal properties of some retinal mechanisms’ (p.84): cells on the retina get 
‘fatigued’, and stop responding to stimulation. This would not explain, however, why 
the stabilized image spontaneously disappears and returns. Moreover, they argue that 
this explanation is inadequate since around 80% of retinal cells have ‘a sustained 
response to both achromatic form and color stimuli’, and that ‘most visual mechanisms 
(including achromatic form, color and depth)’ can function in the absence of input from 
the class of retinal cells that are susceptible to ‘fatigue’ (p.85). 
28 See David et al (2008), pp.524-527 for a review. 
29 Of course, further empirical work is needed to validate this interpretation. At present, 
there are only a couple of relevant studies with deafferented subjects (Farrer et al 2003b, 
Balslev et al 2007), both of which are concerned with the sense of ownership of a 
visually perceived action rather than with the presence or absence of a sense of agency 
tout court. Remember, though, that my current goal is only to explain and demonstrate 
the minimal plausibility of the form of enactivism at issue in this section. 
30 Thanks to Olle Blomberg, Andy Clark, Tomas Bogardus, David Harris, Alisa 
Mandrigin, audiences at the Universities of Warwick and Edinburgh, and an 
anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. 
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